We introduce a natural cryptographic functionality called functional re-encryption. Informally, this functionality, for a public-key encryption scheme and a function F with n possible outputs, transforms ("re-encrypts") an encryption of a message m under an "input public key" pk into an encryption of the same message m under one of the n "output public keys", namely the public key indexed by F (m).
Introduction
• The key point that enables obfuscation in both [18] and [16] is that they obfuscate functionalities that compute a function "inside a ciphertext". For example, in [18] , this is the decryption function and in [16] , it is the signature function. Not surprisingly, it has been noted that given a fully homomorphic encryption scheme [21, 12] , the functionalities of [18, 16] can be easily obfuscated. Thus, we would like to find other paradigms for obfuscating complex functionalities.
• Both re-encryption and obfuscated signatures can be thought of as access control mechanisms. The catch, though, is that both of them embody an "all-or-nothing" form of access controlfor example, in the case of re-encryption, neither the re-encryptor nor the recipient alone can decrypt a ciphertext created by the initiator although together, the two of them can learn the entire contents of the ciphertext. We would like to consider functionalities that capture a finer grained delegation of access.
• An issue that is important in both theory and practice is the presence of auxiliary inputs. Most positive results on obfuscation (including [18, 16] , but also others) do not achieve any form of security against auxiliary inputs that depend on the function being obfuscated. Indeed, this task seems quite hard, as indicated by impossibility results of [13] (for some limited positive results against auxiliary inputs, see [4] ). Can we achieve obfuscation against a large, meaningful class of auxiliary inputs?
In this work, we make progress on the above lines of inquiry. Firstly, we relax (somewhat) the definition of secure obfuscation in the presence of auxiliary inputs, and introduce the notion of collusion resistant obfuscation. Secondly, we show how to obfuscate a natural and complex cryptographic functionality called functional re-encryption in a way that satisfies this notion of security. This functionality captures a finer grained delegation of access, and also protects against collusion between various participating parties.
Collusion Resistant Obfuscation
Consider the following scenario. A department would like to create a login program that will grant access to several users -say, Alice, Bob, and Carol, who have different passwords. The department would like to obfuscate this program and give it to the server that will run it. Now, we would like to guarantee that this obfuscation remains secure even if, for example, Alice were to collude with the server. One can view Alice's password as being specific auxiliary information that an adversary obtains about the program. Note that this is a restricted form of auxiliary information as we do not allow an adversary to learn, say specific bits of Bob or Carol's passwords. In this work, we are interested in the notion of average-case secure obfuscation (as defined by [18, 17] ) and hence in the above example we assume that all passwords are chosen uniformly at random.
One can generalize the above functionality and obtain a general definition of collusion resistant obfuscation. We would like to obfuscate a function family {C λ } that has the following form. Any C K ∈ C λ is parameterized by a set of "secret" keys K = {k 1 , k 2 , · · · , k } (in addition to any other parameters that the circuit might take) that are chosen at random from some specified distribution. Now, define a subset of keys represented through a set of indices T ⊆ [ ].
([ ] denotes the set {1, 2, · · · , }.) We would like to construct an obfuscation of the circuit, denoted by Obf(C K ), so that Obf(C K ) is a "secure obfuscation" of C K (in the sense of [18] ) even against an adversary that knows the set of keys {k i } i∈T .
Functional Re-encryption
Functional re-encryption is an expressive generalization of re-encryption [5, 2] . A functional reencryption functionality is parameterized by a policy function F : D → [n] (i.e, F has domain D and has n possible outputs) chosen from some class of functions, an input public key pk, and n output public keys. The functionality receives as input a ciphertext of message m with "identity" id under the input public key pk. 1 It decrypts the ciphertext using the secret key sk to get m and id, and then re-encrypts m under the "appropriate" output public key pk F (id) . Following our desiderata from before, one could think of functional re-encryption as a form of fine-grained delegation of access.
To motivate the functional re-encryption functionality, consider the following scenario: Alice wishes to have her e-mail server "route" her incoming mail to one of a set of n recipients. The particular recipient to which the ciphertext should be routed depends on both the contents of the ciphertext -essentially, the identity id -as well as Alice's access policy encoded by her function F . The e-mail server does this by "re-encrypting" the contents of the ciphertext under the appropriate public key. The minimal requirement from such a system is that the "re-encryption mechanism" hide both the message and Alice's access policy -it should merely provide a means for the server to do the appropriate routing. 2 One (not particularly appealing) way for Alice to do this would be to give the e-mail server her secret key and her access policy; this lets the server decrypt all incoming messages and determine where to route them. Unfortunately, this "solution" completely fails this minimum requirement. Ideally, Alice would like to "obfuscate" the trivial functional re-encryption program above and give it to the server. We show how to securely obfuscate functional re-encryption which, informally speaking, guarantees that any "attack" that the server can carry out given the obfuscated functional re-encryption program, could also be carried out given only oracle access to the functional reencryption program (which is no power at all!)
Furthermore, in reality we could reasonably expect the server to collude with some of the recipients to learn additional information about messages or about Alice's access policy function F . Clearly, collusion helps the server -he can use a recipient's decryption key together with the re-encryption program to learn the output of F on certain inputs. If we consider the auxiliary input to be the secret keys of the colluding recipients, then our strong notion of collusion-resistant secure obfuscation guarantees that this is the only information that the server could possibly learn by colluding.
Selectively delegating access is also the central theme of a recently introduced notion of predicate encryption [19, 24] (which can be viewed as attribute based encryption in which ciphertexts hide their attributes). In fact, (predicate-hiding, public key) predicate encryption schemes can potentially be used to solve Alice's dilemma. This is done by completely ignoring the email server and giving each of the recipients a "little secret key" that is just powerful enough to decrypt the appropriate ciphertexts (dictated by the access policy). Aside from the fact that there are no known public-key predicate hiding encryption schemes (nor even good definitions of them), this solution has two drawbacks -first, there is no way to revoke access from a recipient other than by having Alice choose a fresh key for herself (which could be quite expensive). Second, this solution requires all recipients to be aware of the existence of an access policy, while the solution based on functional re-encryption is completely invisible to the recipients -they continue using their already registered public keys, and they do not even have to know of the existence of the functional re-encryption mechanism.
Overview of Results and Techniques
Collusion resistant obfuscation. We define the notion of collusion resistant obfuscation which guarantees security against a natural form of auxiliary inputs. This notion of auxiliary input security might be realizable (without random oracles) for many common cryptographic tasks.
Functional Re-encryption. We show, informally:
2 Of course, since the e-mail server does not know who the recipient is, it either sends the resulting ciphertext to all the recipients or publishes it on a bulletin board from which the intended recipient can then access it.
Theorem 1 (Informal) Under the Symmetric External Diffie-Hellman assumption there exists an encryption scheme such that for any function F : D → R with polynomial-sized domain D, there is a collusion-resistant average-case secure obfuscation of the functional re-encryption program w.r.t. F . The size of the input ciphertext in the encryption scheme is O(|D| · poly(λ)), and the size of the output ciphertext is O(poly(λ)) (i.e., independent of the domain and the range of F ).
We now present the ideas behind our construction at a very high level. One can think of a functional re-encryption program as a program that must achieve two goals -a) it must "hide" the policy function F , and b) it must also "hide" the input secret key (that it uses to decrypt the input ciphertext). These two goals must simultaneously be achieved while maintaining the right functionality. Informally, the main innovation in our work is a technique to hide the policy function -this combined with techniques from [18] allows us to achieve both goals simultaneously. We shall now describe this first technique in more detail.
Let G, H, G T be groups such that there is a bilinear map e :
be vectors that denote elements in the domain D of function F and letâ 1 , · · · ,â n ∈ Z q denote elements in the range R of F . Now consider a function OF that maps elements in G d to elements in G T in the following way. OF is parameterized by random generators g ∈ G and h ∈ H. On input g a i , OF outputs e(g, h)â F (i) . We shall now informally sketch how to publish a program that achieves the functionality provided by OF, but at the same time hides F . The program computes a vector α ∈ Z d q such that the inner product a i , α =â F (i) for all i. Note that this is indeed possible as α is a solution to a system of d equations in d variables. The program description simply contains h α . (This can be computed given only hâ F (i) and a i for all i, so we do not actually need the recipient secret keysâ F (i) .) On input g a i , the program computes and outputs
, which is the output as desired. Unfortunately, this solution does not completely hide the function. Note that if F (1) = F (2) (say), then an adversary can learn this by simply running the above program and checking if the output is the same on both the inputs. To get around this problem, we modify the program in the following way. The program picks random w i , for all i, and computes two vectors α, β ∈ Z d q such that the inner product a i , α =w iâF (i) and a i , β =w i , for all i (in our actual solution we require the R.H.S of the second equation to be w i − 1 instead of w i , but we will ignore that for now). The program description now contains h α , h β . On input g a i , the program computes and outputs
w iâF (i) , as well as d j=1 e(g a ij , h β j ) = e(g, h) w i . Now, on two different inputs (of F ) that have the same output, the above program outputs elements of the form (e(g, h) xa , e(g, h) x ) and (e(g, h) ya , e(g, h) y ), for random a, x and y. However, these tuples are indistinguishable from random, even given e(g, h) and e(g, h) a , (by DDH) and hence an adversary cannot tell if F (1) = F (2). This construction now ensures that F is completely hidden. Now, note that if we let {g a i }, 1 ≤ i ≤ d be the input public key and e(g, h)â j be the output public key, then one can potentially use the above construction to build a scheme that converts an encryption of message m under g a i to one under e(g, h)â F (i) . This is precisely what we do. Our encryption schemes are ElGamal-like, the input encryption key contains a set of vectors g a i , · · · , g a d , and an input encryption of message m with identity i uses the key g a i . Finally, in order to obtain a secure obfuscation, we apply techniques from [18] to re-randomize the ciphertexts.
Obfuscating Functional Re-encryption for Arbitrary Policy Functions? A natural question raised by our result is whether it is possible to achieve collusion-resistant obfuscation of functional re-encryption for arbitrary (polynomial-time computable) policy functions F (in particular, functions F with domains of super-polynomial size). We show that this goal is impossible to achieve. In particular, we show that a collusion-resistant obfuscation with respect to a policy function F already contains within it a [3] -style obfuscation (a so-called "predicate obfuscation") of the policy function F . In some sense, this is not entirely surprising, and corresponds to the intuition that a collusion-resistant obfuscation of functional re-encryption allows computation of the function F 3 , and yet hides all internal details of F except the input-output behavior. Together with the impossibility result of [3] for obfuscating general (families of) functions, this shows that there are classes of (polynomial-time computable) policy functions for which it is impossible to construct collusion-resistant secure obfuscation of functional re-encryption. See Appendix D for a formal statement and proof of this result. The next question to ask is whether there is any non-trivial policy function (with a domain of super-polynomial size) for which this goal can be achieved. We informally argue that this may require some new innovation on the question of constructing publickey predicate encryption schemes which satisfy a strong security notion called predicate-hiding. Predicate encryption schemes were defined by Katz, Sahai and Waters [19] , following [22, 14] (in particular, the predicate-hiding property was defined in the work of Shi, Shen and Waters [24] ). Constructions of predicate encryption schemes (even ones that do not achieve predicate-hiding) are known only for simple classes of functions such as inner products [19] . Moreover, in the public-key setting, we do not know how to achieve (any reasonable definition of) predicate-hiding, even for simple functions. Since collusion-resistant obfuscation of functional re-encryption seems to have the same flavor in functionality as predicate-hiding public-key predicate encryption, advancements in the class of policy functions that these primitives can handle seem to be correlated.
Collusion Resistant Secure Obfuscation

Average-case Secure Obfuscation
Throughout this paper, we will implicitly assume that the adversary (as well as simulator) can obtain arbitrary polynomial-size independent auxiliary input z. We remark that our construction is secure even against the presence of such auxiliary information. We now recall the notion of average-case secure obfuscation introduced in [18] below.
Definition 1 An efficient algorithm Obf that takes as input a (probabilistic) circuit C from the family {C λ } and outputs a new (probabilistic) circuit, is an average-case secure obfuscator, if it satisfies the following properties: -Preserving functionality: With overwhelming probability Obf(C) behaves "almost identically"
to C on all inputs. Formally, there exists a negligible function neg(λ), such that for any input length λ and any C ∈ C λ :
where SD(X , Y) denotes the statistical distance between two distributions X and Y.
-Polynomial slowdown: There exists a polynomial p(λ) such that for sufficiently large input lengths λ, for any C ∈ C λ , the obfuscator Obf only enlarges C by a factor of p. That is, |Obf(C)| ≤ p(|C|).
-Average-case Virtual Black-Boxness: There exists an efficient simulator S and a negligible function neg(λ), such that for every efficient distinguisher D, and for every sufficiently long input length λ:
The probability is over the selection of a random circuit C from C λ , and the coins of the distinguisher, the simulator, the oracle, and the obfuscator. 4 
Average-case secure obfuscation with collusion
Consider the case where we would like to obfuscate a function family {C λ } that has the following particular form. Any C K ∈ C λ is parameterized by a set of "secret" keys K = {k 1 , k 2 , · · · , k } (in addition to any other parameters that the circuit might take) that are chosen at random from some specified distribution. Now, define a (non-adaptively chosen) subset of keys represented through a set of indices T ⊆ [ ], where [ ] denotes the set {1, 2, · · · , }. We would like to construct an obfuscation of the circuit, denoted by Obf(C K ), so that Obf(C K ) is a "secure obfuscation" of C K (in the sense of [18] ) even against an adversary that knows the set of keys {k i } i∈T .
We accomplish this using a definition that is similar in spirit to the notion of obfuscation against dependent auxiliary inputs [13] . More precisely, in addition to their usual inputs and oracles, we give both the adversary and the simulator access to a (non-adaptively chosen) subset {k i } i∈T ⊆ K of the keys. This can be seen as auxiliary information about the circuit C K ← C λ . The formal definition of collusion-resistant secure obfuscation is as follows.
Definition 2 An efficient algorithm Obf that takes as input a (probabilistic) circuit and outputs a new (probabilistic) circuit, is a collusion-resistant (average-case) secure obfuscator for the family {C λ } if it satisfies the following properties:
-" Preserving functionality" and " Polynomial Slowdown", as in Definition 1.
-Average-case Virtual Black-Boxness against Collusion: There exists an efficient simulator S, and a negligible function neg(λ), such that for every efficient distinguisher D, every subset T ⊆ [ ], and every sufficiently long input length λ:
The probability is over the selection of a random circuit C K from C λ , and the coins of the distinguisher, the simulator, the oracle, and the obfuscator.
Remarks on the Definition. An even stronger attack model allows the adversary to obtain an obfuscation of a circuit C K where some of the keys in {k i } i∈T are adversarially chosen. Furthermore, one could allow the adversary to select the set T adaptively, after seeing the public keys and/or the obfuscated program. We postpone a full treatment of these issues to future work.
Securely obfuscating Functional Re-encryption
We would like to obtain a collusion-resistant average-case obfuscator for the functional re-encryption functionality. A Functional Re-encryption (FR) functionality associated to function F : D → R, input public/secret key pair (pk, sk), and output public keys pk 1 , . . . , pk |R| 5 is a functionality that takes as input a ciphertext c = I-Enc(pk, id, m) and re-encrypts m under the output public key pk F (id) . More precisely, for a given function F : D → R, we are interested in the family of circuits FR F,D,R = {FR λ,F,D,R } λ>0 where each circuit C pk,sk, pk 1 ,..., pk |R| ∈ FR λ,F,D,R is a probabilistic circuit indexed by a key pair (pk, sk) ← I-Gen(1 λ ), and public keys ( pk i , ) ← O-Gen(1 λ ), and works as follows:
C pk,sk, pk 1 ,..., pk |R| , on input c :
Computes (id, m) ← I-Dec(sk, c), and outputs c ← O-Enc( pk F (id) , m). If I-Dec(sk, c) returns ⊥ then outputs random elements in the format of c. C pk,sk, pk 1 ,..., pk |R| , on a special input keys:
Outputs pk, pk 1 , . . . , pk |R| . Now, for a class of functions, F, we say that a re-encryption program securely obfuscates reencryption for F, if there exists a simulator S that satisfies the collusion resistant obfuscation property w.r.t. FR F,D,R for all F : D → R ∈ F.
In other words, all public keys in the circuit C pk,sk, pk 1 ,..., pk |R| are considered public knowledge;
the only pieces of information we are interested in protecting are the input secret key sk and the function F . Also, note that we are interested in guaranteeing security for arbitrarily chosen F , not F chosen at random. The set of secret keys that will parameterize a functional re-encryption functionality is K = { sk 1 , · · · , sk |R| }. The definition of collusion-resistant average-case secure obfuscation guarantees security against an adversary who not only knows the re-encryption program, but also has access to a subset { sk i } i∈T ⊆ K of the output secret keys. This scenario endows the adversary with considerable power and knowledge. For instance,
• The adversary will inevitably be able to decrypt all ciphertexts c = I-Enc(pk, id, m), where F (id) ∈ T , simply by using the re-encryption program to convert the ciphertext c into an encryption of m under the output public key pk F (id) , and then decrypting it using sk F (id) .
• Moreover, the power to selectively decrypt a subset of the input ciphertexts gives the adversary information about the access policy function F itself. For instance, the adversary can determine if F (id) = i whenever i ∈ T .
• Finally, we remark that the definition of obfuscation for functional re-encryption by itself does not guarantee the semantic security of the input and output encryption schemes. We define these separately and prove the security of the encryption schemes (even in the presence of the re-encryption program). In more detail, we will require the semantic security of the input encryption scheme, on messages encrypted with an identity id * , whenever F (id * ) / ∈ T , even when the adversary is given access to a re-encryption oracle. We will similarly require that the input ciphertext hides the identity id * , under which the message is encrypted. The security of the output encryption scheme will be that of standard semantic security. Since we wish to hide everything about the function F , we will also require the output encryption scheme to be key private; i.e., an encryption under public key pk i will be indistinguishable from an encryption under public key pk j . For formal definitions and proofs of these properties, see Appendix C.
Preliminaries
We let λ be the security parameter throughout this paper. By neg(λ) we denote some negligible function, namely a function µ such that for all c > 0 and all sufficiently large λ, µ(λ) < 1/λ c . For
≈ D 2 means that they are computationally indistinguishable (to be precise, this statement holds for ensembles of distributions).
We let [ ] denote the set {1, · · · , }. We denote vectors by bold-face letters, e.g., a. Let G be a group of prime order q. For a vector a = (a 1 , a 2 , · · · , a ) ∈ Z q and group element g ∈ G, we write g a to mean the vector (g a 1 , g a 2 , · · · , g a ). For two vectors a and b where a and b are either both in Z q or both in G , we write ab to denote their component-wise product and a/b to denote their component-wise division. In case b ∈ Z q , we let a b denote their component-wise exponentiation. For a vector a and scalar x, xa = ab, a/x = a/b, and a x = a b , where
Assumptions. We assume the existence of families of groups {G (λ) } λ>0 , {H (λ) } λ>0 and {G
(λ)
T } λ>0 with prime order q = q(λ), endowed with a bilinear map e λ :
T . When clear from the context, we omit the superscript that refers to the security parameter from all these quantities. The mapping is efficiently computable, and is bilinear -namely, for any generators g ∈ G and h ∈ H, and a, b ∈ Z q , e(g a , h b ) = e(g, h) ab . We also require the bilinear map to be non-degenerate, in the sense that if g ∈ G, h ∈ H generate G and H respectively, then e(g, h) = 1.
We assume the Symmetric External Diffie-Hellman Assumption (SXDH)), which says that the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is hard in both of the groups G and H. That is, when
and a similar statement when g ∈ G is replaced with h ∈ H. In contrast, the assumption that DDH is hard in one of the two groups G or H is simply called the external Diffie-Hellman assumption (XDH). These assumptions were first proposed and used in various works, including [25, 6, 23, 15] .
In this work, we use the SXDH assumption.
Collusion-Resistant Functional Re-encryption
We are now ready to present our construction of a functional re-encryption scheme from the symmetric external Diffie-Hellman (SXDH) assumption. We first construct our basic encryption schemes in Section 4.1. In Section 4.2, we describe a program that implements the functional re-encryption scheme. Finally, in Section 4.3, we prove that our functional re-encryption program satisfies the notion of collusion-resistant average-case secure obfuscation.
Construction of the Encryption Schemes
A functional re-encryption scheme transforms a ciphertext under an input public key into a ciphertext of the same message under one of many output public keys. In our construction, the input and the output ciphertexts have different shapes -namely, the input ciphertext lives in the "source group" G whereas the output ciphertext lives in the "target group" G T . We now proceed to describe our input and output encryption schemes which are both variants of the ElGamal encryption scheme.
Parameters. The public parameters for both the input and the output encryption scheme consist of the description of three groups G, H and G T of prime order q = q(λ), with a bilinear map e : G × H → G T . Also included in the public parameters are two generators -g ∈ G and h ∈ H. Let M = M(λ) ⊆ G denote the message space of both the input and output encryption schemes. We assume that |M| is polynomial in λ. The construction of our output encryption scheme requires this to be the case; however, one can encrypt longer messages by breaking the message into smaller blocks and encrypting the blocks separately.
The Input Encryption Scheme. We first construct the input encryption scheme, which is parameterized by d = d(λ) which is an upper bound on the size of the domain of the policy function that we intend to support. We will also use a NIZK proof system; we note that [15] provides an efficient scheme for the type of statements we use, which is perfectly sound and computationally zero-knowledge based on SXDH. We remark that, while the semantic security of the input encryption scheme does not require this NIZK proof, the obfuscation guarantee provided by our construction relies on it; if, for example the adversary were to provide an invalid ciphertext as input to the re-encryption program (e.g. by combining 2 valid ciphertexts with different i's), the program might output some group elements that are distinguishable from random to an adversary that possesses some of the recipient secret keys.
The input encryption scheme is as follows:
q that are linearly independent. We also generate crs, a common reference string (abbreviated CRS) for the NIZK proof system. Output pk = (crs, g, g a 1 , · · · , g a d ), and sk = (a 1 , · · · , a d ). We remark that the public key pk can be viewed as being made up of d public keys pk i = (g, g a i ) of a simpler scheme.
To encrypt a message m ∈ M, with "identity" i ∈ [d], choose random exponents r and r from Z q , and compute:
(a) C = g ra i ; D = g r m, and
(c) π, a proof that these values are correctly formed, i.e. that they correspond to one of the vectors g a i contained in the public key.
Output the ciphertext (E, E , π) where E = (C, D) and E = (C , D ). (Looking ahead, we remark that E looks like an encryption of message m under pk i , while E looks like an encryption of 1 G under pk i . E is primarily used by the re-encryption program for input re-randomization, and is not required if the encryption scheme is used stand-alone without the functional re-encryption program.)
If any of the components of the ciphertext E is 1 G or if the proof π does not verify, output ⊥. 6 Ignore E , π subsequently, and parse E as (C, D). Check that for some
The Output Encryption scheme. We now describe the output encryption scheme.
1. O-Gen(1 λ ): Pickâ ← Z q . Let pk = hâ and sk =â.
O-Enc( pk, m):
To encrypt a message m ∈ M ⊂ G,
• Choose random number r ← Z q .
• Compute Y = (hâ) r and W = h r .
• Output the ciphertext as
The decryption algorithm does the following:
• For each m ∈ M, test if e(m, h) = Q. If so, output m and halt. (Note that if e(m, h) are precomputed for all m ∈ M, then this step can be implemented with a table lookup.)
Obfuscation for Functional Re-encryption
We now describe our scheme for securely obfuscating the functional re-encryption functionality for the input and output encryption schemes described above.
The Functional Re-encryption Key. The obfuscator gets an input secret key sk, the n output public keys pk i , and the description of a function
It outputs a functional re-encryption key which is a description of a program that takes as input a ciphertext of message m ∈ M and identity i ∈ [d] under public key pk, and outputs a ciphertext of m under pk F (i) . The obfuscator does the following:
:
The re-encryption key consists of the tuple (A, B) where A = h α and B = h β . We remark that computing the re-encryption key does not require knowledge of the output secret keys. To compute h α , one can take the output public keys hâ 1 , · · · , hâ d , and with the knowledge of the input secret keys {a 1 , · · · , a d } and random values w 1 , . . . , w d , one can solve the set of equations
, to obtain h α . h β can be computed in a similar manner.
The Functional Re-encryption Program. Given the functional re-encryption key (A, B) and an input ciphertext (E, E ) where E = (C, D) and E = (C , D ), the functional re-encryption program performs the following steps:
1. Sanity Check: If any of the components of the input ciphertext E is 1 G or if the proof π does not verify, output ( F , G) for random F , G ∈ G T . The sanity check is to ensure that the next step -namely, input re-randomization -randomizes the ciphertext E.
2. Input Re-Randomization: Pick a random exponent t ← Z q and compute C = C(C ) t and
Note that the random exponent t is used to re-randomize the encryption of 1 G , and this re-randomized encryption of 1 G is multiplied with the encryption of m to get a re-randomized encryption of m.
3. The main Re-encryption step:
Output the ciphertext ( F , G).
Preserving functionality. Let the input ciphertext be (C, D, C , D , π). Given that π verifies, we know these values will be of the form C = g ra i , D = g r m and C = g r a i , D = g r . (If π does not verify, then both the functionality and the above program will output random group elements.) Let the re-encryption key be (A, B) where A = h α and B = h β .
• First, the input re-randomization step computes
where we definedr ∆ = r + tr .
• Second, the main re-encryption step computes
where ρ =rw i is uniformly random in Z q , even given all the randomness in the input ciphertext. The claim about ρ being uniformly random crucially relies on the "sanity check" step in the re-encryption program (in particular, since r = 0).
Thus, the final ciphertext is distributed exactly like the output of O-Enc( pk F (i) , m).
Semantic security of encryption schemes. We show that the input and output encryption schemes are semantically secure (in particular, the input scheme hides both the message and the "identity", and the output scheme is also key-private) under the DDH assumption over different groups, even given the re-encryption program. We present a detailed proof in Appendix C.
Remark. Note that if d = n = 1, then our construction (with the removal of certain now unnecessary parts, such as the NIZK proof) reduces to something very similar to that of [18] . Also, note that if the function F were to have larger (super-polynomial) domain, then our solution would satisfy the property of polynomial slowdown only if F were represented as a truth table. If F has large domain but a concise representation, then this property no longer holds.
Proof of Collusion-resistant Secure Obfuscation
We show that our construction is a collusion-resistant average-case secure obfuscator for the functional re-encryption functionality. In order to satisfy collusion-resistance, the encryption as well as the obfuscation scheme have to be modified somewhat. The modifications do not affect the functionality or the security of the scheme, and are merely artifacts that seem necessary to show that our functional re-encryption scheme meets the rigorous demands of being a secure obfuscation.
A necessary modification to the encryption and obfuscation schemes. Consider the case where a corrupt recipient that holds secret key sk j colludes with the re-encryption program. Now, essentially, this recipient has access to a program that selectively decrypts input ciphertexts that are encrypted with an identity i such that F (i) = j. However, the simulator only has oracle access to such a program and must yet produce a "fake" re-encryption program, that on input a ciphertext of message m with identity id, outputs a correct ciphertext of m under pk j . Hence, in order to put the simulator on an equal footing with the adversary we need to give the simulator the power to produce an explicit program which can selectively decrypt input ciphertexts. One way to do this is to cheat and give the simulator the vector a i , for all i such that F (i) = j, in our construction, which we will refer to as sk i . (Note that sk i is a secret key that allows for the selective decryption of ciphertexts with identity i, but not any other ciphertext.). For ease of exposition, we shall for now assume that the simulator obtains sk i for all i such that F (i) ∈ T . However, we would not like to resort to this cheat -we show in Appendix B how this can be avoided. In other words, we first show the security of our scheme in the modified model where the simulator obtains the sk i values for all i such that F (i) ∈ T . Next, we show that if the scheme is secure in this model, then it can be easily transformed into a scheme that is secure in the standard model where the simulator, like the real world adversary, only gets sk j values for j ∈ T . We will now focus on proving the former statement. Towards showing that our obfuscation satisfies the collusion-resistant secure obfuscation definition in the model where the simulator obtains the sk i values for all i such that F (i) ∈ T , we first construct a simulator.
Simulator. Let C ← FR λ,F,d,n be a functional re-encryption circuit for the function
, parameterized by the input keys (pk, sk) and the output keys (
be a set of corrupted receivers. We construct a simulator S that gets as input the secret keys sk j of all the corrupted receivers (where j ∈ T ) and the secret keys sk i such that F (i) ∈ T , and has oracle access to the functionality C. First, consider the case where none of the receivers is corrupted. Then, the simulator works as follows. Recall that the obfuscated re-encryption program consists of the tuple (h, h α , h β ) where and α and β are solutions to some linear equations involving the input and output secret keys. The simulator, instead, simply picks α and β uniformly at random (with no relation to the input or the output keys). It then runs the adversary on this "junk functional re-encryption program" (along with the secret keys of the corrupted receivers). Under the SXDH assumption, we manage to show that this is indistinguishable from the obfuscated program that the adversary expects to get (even if the adversary is also given oracle access to the real re-encryption circuit C).
If some of the receivers are corrupted, the simulator cannot choose α and β at random any more. Indeed, since the distinguisher has the corrupted output keys, it can check if the α and β (in the exponent) satisfy the equations involving the corrupted keys, namely { sk j } j∈T . Thus, the simulator has to choose α and β as uniformly random solutions to a set of equations that involve the corrupted keys. It turns out that this can be done efficiently since the simulator knows the keys of the corrupted receivers as well.
Without further ado, let us present the simulator S C (1 λ , T , { sk i } i∈T , {sk j } j∈F −1 (T ) ) that works as follows:
1. Query the oracle C on input the string "keys" to get all the public keys, including the input public key pk = (g, g a 1 , · · · , g a d ); and the output public keys pk 1 = (h, hâ 1 ), · · · , pk n = (h, hâ n ).
2. Sample random w 1 , . . . ,
Note that this can be done efficiently using the knowledge of the vectors a i that we obtained in {sk j } j∈F −1 (T ) , as well as theâ F (i) values which are part of the corrupted secret keys.
Compute A = h α , and B = h β . Output the tuple (A, B) as the re-encryption key.
We now show that the output of the simulator described above is indistinguishable from an obfuscation of the re-encryption functionality (given in Section 4.2), even to a distinguisher that has the corrupted receivers' secret keys and oracle access to the re-encryption functionality. This proves that the obfuscation scheme we constructed in section 4.2 is a collusion-resistant average-case secure obfuscation satisfying Definition 2. More formally, we show:
for obfuscator Obf, where C ← FR λ,F,d,n is a uniformly random re-encryption circuit parameterized by (pk, sk) ← I-Gen(1 λ ) and
From the above theorem, our main theorem (which we stated informally as Theorem 1) follows after making the necessary modifications to the construction outlined earlier. We now describe a sketch of the proof of Theorem 2. For the formal proof, see Appendix A.
Proof.(sketch.) At a high level, the proof will go through the following steps:
• Step 1: For simplicity, let us first consider the case when there is no collusion -that is, neither the distinguisher nor the simulator has access to any of the output secret keys. Later, we will point out the necessary modifications to achieve collusion-resistance.
We first show (in Lemma 1) that the re-encryption key is indistinguishable from random group elements to any distinguisher D who is given the public keys for the input and output encryption scheme (but no oracle access). In other words, we will show that constructing a re-encryption key (A, B) where A = h α and B = h β with α, β being solutions to the equations
is indistinguishable from constructing a re-encryption key with uniformly random α and β. This follows from two ideas -first, under the DDH assumption in group H, it is hard to distinguish between (h, h α , h β ) where α and β are solutions to Equations 1, from the case where they are solutions to the same set of equations with the right-hand sides replaced by uniformly random elements in Z * q . 7 Next, we note that choosing α, β as a solution to a set of equations with uniformly random right-hand side is equivalent to simply choosing random α, β. This completes the first step -in Appendix A we show that this generalizes to the case where T is non-empty, and the simulator's α, β are chosen as a random solution to the resulting underconstrained set of equations.
• Step 2: Next, we will provide our distinguisher D with oracle access to a random oracle that simply returns random group elements of the same format as the output ciphertext of the re-encryption program. (The only exception is that, when it receives a ciphertext encrypted under id such that F (id) ∈ T , it honestly performs the re-encryption.) We then show in Lemma 2, that the re-encryption key is indistinguishable from random group elements to this distinguisher D RO as well.
This follows from
Step 1 fairly easily once we note that the distinguisher in Step 1 could easily simulate this random oracle itself.
•
Step 3: Next, in Lemma 3, we will provide our distinguisher D with oracle access to either the re-encryption oracle or the random oracle, and argue that D will not be able to determine which oracle it is given, even if it is also given the real re-encryption key.
The main intuition behind this proof is that, based on SXDH, we can show that honestly generated outputs ciphertexts are indistinguishable from random tuples. This is fairly easy to see: consider public key hâ, and the following tuple e(g, h w ), e(g, h r ) · e(m, h) for random a, r ∈ Z q . If w =âr, this is a valid encryption of m, if w is a random element of Z q , then this is a random tuple from G T × G T .
A fairly straightforward hybrid argument then shows that a real encryption oracle for public keys pk 1 , . . . , pk n is indistinguishable from a random oracle which only produces valid ciphertexts for pk i with i ∈ T (even when the distinguisher is given sk i for i ∈ T ). Now, we note that we can generate a real re-encryption key and perfectly simulate either the real re-encryption oracle or the random re-encryption oracle given only pk 1 , . . . , pk n , and either the encryption oracle or the random oracle described above. We conclude that the real re-encryption oracle and random re-encryption oracle are indistinguishable even given the real re-encryption key (and sk i for i ∈ T ).
Step 4: Finally, in Lemma 4, we will again provide our distinguisher D with oracle access to either the re-encryption oracle or the random oracle and argue that it will not be able to determine which oracle it is given, this time when given the simulated re-encryption key instead.
Again, this follows from Step 3, when we note that the distinguisher in Step 3 could easily ignore the re-encryption key it is given and instead run the simulator to generate a simulated one.
We have argued that the distinguisher has the same behavior given the real re-encryption key and real re-encryption oracle or the real re-encryption key and random oracle (Step 3), that it has the same behavior given the real re-encryption key and random oracle or the simulated reencryption key and random oracle (Step 2), and that it has the same behavior given the simulated re-encryption key and random oracle or the simulated re-encryption key and real re-encryption oracle (Step 4). Putting everything together, we conclude that the real re-encryption key and simulated re-encryption key are indistinguishable, even given access to the real re-encryption oracle. Thus, we obtain the proof of Theorem 2. 
A Formal Proof of Collusion-resistant Secure Obfuscation (Theorem 2)
For any function
, security parameter λ, and distinguisher algorithm D, we define two distributions Real-C(D, 1 λ , F, T ) and Sim-C(D, 1 λ , F, T ) as follows. Informally, Real-C(D, 1 λ , F, T ) is the distribution that describes the output of the distinguisher D given the obfuscated functional re-encryption program, and Sim-C(D, 1 λ , F, T ) is the distribution describing the output of the distinguisher given the simulated program (where in both cases the distinguisher is also given oracle access to the re-encryption circuit). We will show that these two distributions are indistinguishable under the SXDH assumption, which shows that our obfuscation method achieves the notion of collusion-resistant secure obfuscation (Definition 2). Note, that as mentioned before, we will first provide both our distinguisher D as well as the simulator with {a id } id∈F −1 (T ) (where T is the set of corrupted recipients). We will show how to remove this restriction in Appendix B.
Real-C(D, 1 λ , F, T ):
1. Choose random g from G and h from H. Choose random vectors a 1 , · · · , a d from Z d q and exponentsâ 1 , · · · ,â n from Z q . Generate a CRS crs for the NIZK proof system. 2. Set pk = (crs, g, g a 1 , · · · , g a d ), sk = (a 1 , . . . , a d ), and pk 1 = (h, hâ 1 ), · · · , pk n = (h, hâ n ).
Let C ∈ FR λ,F,[d],
[n] be the corresponding circuit, i.e. C = C pk,sk, pk 1 ,..., pk n .
Run the real re-encryption key generation procedure to generate a re-encryption key (Z, A, B).
That is, pick z, w 1 , . . . , w d at random from Z q . Choose vectors α = α 1 , · · · , α d and β = β 1 , · · · , β d at random from Z d q with the restriction that
Compute Z = h z , A = h zα , and B = h zβ .
5. Let b be the output D C (pk, pk 1 , · · · , pk n , (Z, A, B), {â j } j∈T , {a id } id∈F −1 (T ) ).
Output b.
Sim-C(D, 1 λ , F, T )
1. Choose random g from G and h from H. Choose random vectors a 1 , · · · , a d from Z d q and exponentsâ 1 , · · · ,â n from Z q . Generate a CRS crs for the NIZK proof system.
Set pk
, sk = (a 1 , . . . , a d ), and pk 1 = (h, hâ 1 ), · · · , pk n = (h, hâ n ).
Let C ∈ FR λ,F,[d],
[n] be the corresponding circuit, i.e. C = C pk,sk, pk 1 ,..., pk n . 
Run
Output b.
Theorem 3 Assuming SXDH, for all F , T , and PPT D, the distributions Real-C(D, 1 λ , F, T ) and Sim-C(D, 1 λ , F, T ) are indistinguishable.
Proof.
We prove this through a series of steps.
Step 1:
We begin by considering the following two distributions:
• RealInput(1 λ , F, T ), which proceeds as Real-C(D, 1 λ , F, T ) except that the output is
• SimInput(1 λ , F, T ), which proceeds as Real-C(D, 1 λ , F, T ) except that the output is
for uniformly random α, β ∈ Z d q subject to the condition that a i , α = w iâF (i) and a i , β = w i − 1 for all i such that F (i) ∈ T where, as before, the w i 's are randomly chosen. The difference between the two distributions is that in SimInput(1 λ , F, T ), the vectors α and β are required to satisfy only a subset of the constraints (namely, ones that correspond to i ∈ F −1 (T )). In particular, if the corrupted set T is empty, then α and β are truly random vectors.
Lemma 1 Assuming SXDH, for all F , T , RealInput(1 λ , F, T ) and SimInput(1 λ , F, T ) are indistinguishable.
Proof. Consider the following hybrid distribution, in which α and β are chosen to satisfy a random set of equations:
• HybridInput(1 λ , F, T ), which proceeds as Real-C(D, 1 λ , F, T ) except that the output is
for α, β chosen as a random solution to:
where the w i 's and y i 's are chosen at random from Z q .
First, it is easy to see that the distributions HybridInput(1 λ , F, T ) and SimInput(1 λ , F, T ) are really the same distribution. This is because in both distributions, for every i ∈ F −1 (T ), the right-hand side of the two equations -one involving α and the other involving β -use the same randomness w i , whereas for i / ∈ F −1 (T ), the right-hand sides are random and independent (in fact, they are independent ofâ F (i) as well).
We now claim that HybridInput(1 λ , F, T ) and RealInput(1 λ , F, T ) are computationally indistinguishable, assuming SXDH. This finishes the proof of the lemma. Claim 1 Assuming SXDH, for all F , T , HybridInput(1 λ , F, T ) and RealInput(1 λ , F, T ) are indistinguishable.
Proof. This can be proved via a series of hybrids H t (1 λ , F, T ), for 0 ≤ t ≤ d.
Clearly, H 0 (1 λ , F, T ) = RealInput(1 λ , F, T ), and H d (λ, F, T ) = HybridInput(1 λ , F, T ). We will argue that for all t = 1, · · · , d, the distributions H t−1 (λ) and H t (λ) are indistinguishable by SXDH.
Note that if F (t) ∈ T , then the two distributions are identical. For all other cases, suppose there is a PPT adversary A that can distinguish the two distributions. Then we construct an adversary B that acts as a distinguisher for SXDH. B gets as input a tuple (h, X 1 = h x 1 , X 2 = h x 2 , X 3 = h x 3 ) where either x 3 = x 1 x 2 (corresponding to an SXDH instance) or x 3 is uniformly random (corresponding to a non-SXDH instance). B works as follows:
1. Choose random a 1 , · · · , a d from Z d q , and randomâ j from Z q for all j = F (t). Generate a CRS crs for the NIZK proof system.
2. Choose random w 1 , · · · , w t−1 , w t+1 , · · · , w d (all w i 's except w t ) and random
4. Choose a random z ← Z q , and generate the tuple
Feed this tuple to A and output whatever A outputs.
Note that we replaced hâ F (t) by X 1 , thus implicitly settingâ F (t) = x 1 . We also set
Thus, we implicitly set y t = x 3 .
If X 3 = h x 1 x 2 , then we have perfectly simulated H t−1 , and otherwise we have perfectly simulated H t . Thus a PPT algorithm A that distinguishes between the hybrids H t−1 and H t directly results in B being able to break SXDH with the same advantage.
Step 2: Now, we provide the distinguisher with access to an oracle RO that behaves as follows:
• on input (C, D, C , D , π), where C, C are from G d 1 and D, D are from G 1 , it checks whether I-Dec(sk, (C, D, C , D , π) ) produces a pair (id, m), where m ∈ M and id ∈ F −1 (T ). If so, it behaves as the honest re-encryption functionality would and produces a valid encryption of m under public key pk F (id) . Otherwise it returns [ F , G, H], where F , G are chosen at random from G T and H is chosen at random from H.
Let Real-RO(D, 1 λ , F, T ) (resp. Sim-RO(D, 1 λ , F, T )) be the distribution which proceeds as in Real-C(D, 1 λ , F, T ) (resp. Sim-C (D, 1 λ , F, T ) ), but where the distinguisher is given access to RO rather than the real re-encryption circuit C. I.e. replace step 5 with:
We consider the resulting distributions Real-RO (D, 1 λ , F, T ) and Sim-RO (D, 1 λ , F, T ) , and show the following. and SimInput(1 λ , F, T ) are indistinguishable and hence it also implies the lemma.
Step 3:
We now argue that it doesn't matter whether D is given oracle access to the real re-encryption circuit C or to the RO oracle, even when it is also given access to the real obfuscated re-encryption program. Let Real-O i (D, 1 λ , F, T ) be the distribution which proceeds as in Real-C(D, 1 λ , F, T ), but where the distinguisher is given access to O i rather than the real re-encryption circuit C.
We will show, under the SXDH assumption, that Real-
which will prove the lemma.
We now proceed to show that, given a distinguisher such that Real-O i (D, 1 λ , F, T ) and Real-O i+1 (D, 1 λ , F, T ) produce noticeably different outputs, we will construct an adversary A that will break the SXDH assumption. Now, A takes as input an SXDH instance, which is a tuple (h,Ā =hā,R =hr,W ), and has to decide whetherW =hār orhw for randomā,r,w ∈ Z q . A does the following:
1. A chooses random g from G, and samples sk = (a 1 , · · · , a d ) at random from Z d q , as well aŝ a j from Z q for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n, j = i. It generates a CRS crs for the NIZK proof system.
2.
A sets pk = (crs, g, g a 1 , · · · , g a d ), pk i = (h,Ā), and pk j = (h, hâ j ), for j = i. A creates a valid re-encryption key (Z, A, B). compute the main re-encryption step as in the real re-encryption program:
• Here we add an additional step: Pick random exponent v from Z q and set:
• Finally, we re-randomize the output ciphertext as in the real re-encryption program: Pick a random exponent s ← Z q and compute F = F s , G = G s and H = H s .
• Output ciphertext ( F , G, H).
4.
A outputs whatever D outputs.
Let us consider the two cases: when the tuple that A receives is an SXDH instance and when it is a random instance.
Case 1: A receives an SXDH instance. Now, whenW =hār, we show that A perfectly simulates Real-O i+1 (D, 1 λ , F, T ), providing D with a real re-encryption key and oracle access to O i+1 . Now, (h,Ā) can be interpreted as a randomly generated public key for the output encryption scheme. Hence the honest re-encryption key created (Z, A, B) has the correct distribution, so D receives the right input. Now, let us consider A's responses to D's oracle queries. First, note that, by the soundness of the NIZK proof, we have a guarantee that any oracle query made byD will be an encryption of some message m under some id ∈ [d]. Hence, we only need to bother about simulating such queries. The only thing that A does differently is in steps 3e and 3d above. When D queries a ciphertext (C, D, C , D ) that is an encryption of message m with identity id, such that F (id) = i, then A re-randomizes the ciphertext using elements e(g,W v = hār v ) and e(g,R v = hr v ). If the initial ciphertext used randomness r, r , then the result will be identical to running the real re-encryption program, but choosing t = t + vr r zw i in the input re-randomization step. Thus A perfectly simulates oracle O i+1 in this case. When D queries a ciphertext (C, D, C , D ) that is an encryption of message m with identity id, such that F (id) = i, O simply outputs whatever O i+1 does, thus simulating oracle O i+1 in this case as well. We conclude that when A receives an SXDH instance, it perfectly simulates Real-O i+1 (D, 1 λ , F 
, T ).
Case 2: A receives a random tuple.
Similarly, when the tuple that A receives is not a SXDH instance (and is random), then we show that O perfectly simulates O i . When D queries a ciphertext (C, D, C , D ) that is an encryption of message m with identity id, such that F (id) = i (or when the sanity check fails), then O outputs whatever O i+1 outputs, which is the same as what O i outputs on such encryptions. We now consider the case when D queries a ciphertext (C, D, C , D ) that is an encryption of message m with identity id, such that F (id) = i.
Let us denote C = g σ , D = g ν , (similarly, C = g σ ,D = g ν ), andW = gw. Now, after the input re-encryption step, we obtain C = g (σ+tσ ) , H = g ν+tν . Hence, we have:
The final output of the oracle consists of terms (F ,Ĝ,Ĥ), where
H is uniformly random, since s is chosen at random from Z q .F ,Ĝ are uniformly random since t, v are random, and from the fact that ν = 0 (since the sanity check ensures that H = 1). Hence O perfectly simulates O i in this case. We conclude that, for all i,
Combining everything, we get the proof of Lemma 3.
Step 4:
Finally, we argue that no distinguisher can distinguish the real re-encryption oracle from RO, when given the simulated circuit (and the appropriate public and secret keys).
B A Necessary Modification to the Encryption and Obfuscation Schemes
Let us assume that the corrupt recipient holds secret key sk j and that F (i) = j. Now clearly, a corrupt recipient (that colludes with the re-encryption program) has the ability to decrypt input ciphertexts that have id = i. That is, the corrupt recipient can simply take I-Enc(pk, i, m), feed this as input into the re-encryption program, obtain O-Enc( pk j , m) as output and then decrypt this to obtain m. So, in order to simulate the re-encryption program correctly, the simulator would need to be able to produce encryptions of message m under pk j whenever the input ciphertext has id = i = F −1 (j). This calls for some sort of selective decryption of input ciphertexts. Thus, we would like to ensure that a simulator can selectively decrypt ciphertexts with id = i such that F (i) = j, so that the simulator can ensure that the output ciphertext is correct. However, we would not want to give the simulator the ability to decrypt other input ciphertexts. Luckily for us, the secret key sk i = a i is exactly such a key that allows for the selective decryption of messages with id = i. In Appendix A, we "cheated" and endowed our simulator with additional power by giving it sk i as well. In this section we shall see how to remove this cheat. We would like to modify our construction so that the simulator, which knows sk j , can also learn sk i using just the oracle access to the functional re-encryption functionality.
Our idea is to modify the input encryption scheme in the following manner. We will publish k * i = I-Enc(pk, i, sk i ) as part of the input public key, so that the simulator can feed k * i to the re-encryption oracle, obtain O-Enc( pk j , sk i ) as output, and, using knowledge of sk j , recover sk i . At a first glance, it seems that this might require the input encryption scheme to be circular secure. However, we note that this need not be the case. We only need to publish a specific string k * i , as part of the public key, that "denotes" an encryption of sk with id = i. Hence, we modify the input encryption scheme so that the public key now includes randomly chosen k * i for all i ∈ D. Furthermore, we modify the input decryption algorithm so that it will now check if the input ciphertext is k * i for any i ∈ D and if so output sk i ; otherwise the input decryption algorithm works as before. This modification now allows the simulator to learn sk i , using which the simulator can construct an appropriate re-encryption key and program.
Next, we need to ensure that the real re-encryption program outputs an encryption of sk i under pk j when fed with k * i (as the adversary now also has access to a string that denotes an encryption of sk i with id = i). To do this, we will modify the re-encryption scheme to include q i = O-Enc( pk F (i) , sk i ) for all i ∈ D as part of the re-encryption key. Next, we modify the reencryption program so that now, for all i ∈ D, on input k * i , the program will re-randomize q i and output this instead. On all other input ciphertexts, the re-encryption program works as before.
We note that the proof in section A implies that the above modified scheme is a collusionresistant secure obfuscation. To see this, note that given {sk id = a id } id∈F −1 (T ) , one can easily simulate access to an oracle for the modified encryption functionality. (The only difference is that when the adversary queries the oracle on one of the values k * i included in the public key, we compute and return O-Enc( pk F (i) , sk i ).) Similarly, given access to the modified oracle, one can easily compute sk i for all i ∈ F −1 (T ) simply by calling the oracle to obtain O-Enc( pk F (i) , sk i ) and decrypting the result. Thus, any distinguisher that can distinguish the real and simulated game for this modfied re-encryption scheme can distinguish equally well between games Real-C (D, 1 λ , F, T ) and Sim-C(D, 1 λ , F, T ), so the proof in section A implies security for the modified scheme.
C Semantic Security of Input and Output Encryption schemes based on SXDH
We show that the input encryption scheme (with public key pk) is semantically secure (i.e., it hides both the message and the "identity") under the SXDH assumption. Furthermore, we show that this holds even if the adversary is given oracle access to a functional re-encryption oracle for randomly chosen output public keys pk 1 , . . . , pk n and an adversarially chosen policy function F , as well as a subset of the corresponding secret keys { sk j } j∈T (where the "corrupted set" T is arbitrary, but independent of the keys). Of course, we cannot guarantee any security if the challenge ciphertext is encrypted using a identity i ∈ [d] such that F (i) ∈ T . This is simply because the adversary can use her oracle to re-encrypt the challenge ciphertext under the public key pk F (i) , and then recover the message using the secret key sk F (i) . Thus, informally, we only require that semantic security holds as long as the identity i used in the challenge ciphertext is such that F (i) / ∈ T . Conceptually, the proof proceeds in two steps: first, we show that the extra ability that the adversary obtains (in the form of the functional re-encryption oracle and some of the output secret keys) can be simulated using the knowledge of some "relevant parts" of the input secret key sk. More precisely, recall that the input secret key sk is composed of d vectors a i ∈ Z d q , one for each
We show that the view of an adversary who knows the output secret key sk j (and has access to the functional re-encryption oracle) can be simulated using the "keys" {a i :
Thus, it suffices to show that I-Enc(pk, i 0 , m 0 ) c ≈ I-Enc(pk, i 1 , m 1 ), even given the vectors a t for all t ∈ [d] \ {i 0 , i 1 }. This follows easily from the DDH assumption over the group G. Recall that a ciphertext of the identity-message pair (i b , m b ) under the input encryption scheme consists of the pair (E, E ) where E = (g ra i b , g r m b ) for a uniformly random r (and E is the corresponding encryption of 0). Now, under the DDH assumption over G, E looks like a tuple of uniformly random group elements, which hides both the "identity" i b as well as the message m b .
Semantic security of the output encryption scheme (with public key pk) follows directly from the DDH assumption in the group H. Note that the presence of a re-encryption oracle (with pk as one of the output public keys) does not affect the semantic security since the oracle can be simulated using just pk (and in particular, without any knowledge of sk).
We now present the proofs in detail.
C.1 Security of the Input Encryption Scheme
We first formally define what we mean by the security of the input encryption scheme. Roughly speaking, we would like the input encryption scheme with respect to a public key pk to be semantically secure (i.e., it hides both the "identity" and the message). Furthermore, we would like the semantic security to hold even if the adversary is given access to a functional re-encryption oracle for some (adversarially specified) function
, randomly chosen output public keys pk 1 , . . . , pk n , as well as a subset of the corresponding secret keys { sk j } j∈T . Of course, we cannot guarantee any security if the "challenge" id * is such that j = F (id * ) ∈ T . This is simply because the adversary can first get the challenge ciphertext re-encrypted under pk j (using the re-encryption oracle) and then use the secret key sk j to recover the message. Thus, informally, we require security to hold as long as this event does not happen which leads us to the notion of collusion-resistant indistinguishability of encryptions, defined below. A 2 , A 3 ) is a tuple of p.p.t. algorithms and λ ∈ N, denote the result of the following probabilistic experiment: (Let C := C F,sk, pk 1 ,..., pk n denote the functional re-encryption functionality for an input key-pair (pk, sk) and output public keys pk 1 , . . . , pk n .) 
Note that ultimately we would like to achieve a stronger security guarantee by guaranteeing the indistinguishability of encryptions in the experiment above, even when the adversary A 2 is given the real functional re-encryption program (as opposed to oracle access to the functional re-encryption functionality). However, showing the theorem stated below will suffice for us, as we can combine this together with Theorem 2 to obtain the stronger security guarantee.
Theorem 4 Under the SXDH assumption, the input encryption scheme Π I = (I-Gen, I-Enc, I-Dec) when modified as described in appendix B satisfies Definition 3 (collusionresistant indistinguishability under CPA attacks).
Proof.
Define the following oracle RO that behaves as follows:
• On input (C, D, C , D , π) , where all the vectors are from G d 1 and D, D ∈ G, it checks whether I-Dec(sk, (C, D, C , D , π)) produces (id, m) for any m ∈ M and id ∈ F −1 (T ). If so, it behaves as the honest re-encryption functionality would and produces a valid encryption of m under public key pk F (id) . Otherwise it returns [ E, G, H], where E, G are chosen at random from G T and H is chosen at random from H.
• On input k * id (for one of the
, where E, G are chosen at random from G T and H is chosen at random from H.
First, consider the following experiments H 1 b , b = 0, 1 which is identical to CR-IND b , except that adversary A 2 gets oracle access to RO instead of C. Formally,
, and all b ∈ {0, 1}:
is negligible.
Proof. Lemma 3 shows that the output of C is indistinguishable from the output of RO even given the real re-encryption program. The proof of this proposition trivially follows from this lemma and from the semantic security of the output encryption scheme (shown in section C.2).
Next, consider the following experiments H 2 b , b = 0, 1 which is identical to H 1 b , except that adversaries A 2 , A 3 get partial decryption keys for the input encryption scheme {sk i } i∈F −1 (T ) = {a i } i∈F −1 (T ) , but do not get any oracle access. Formally,
Proof. The proof of this proposition follows from the fact that (1) the reduction in H 2 b can perfectly simulate RO to adversary A 2 , by simply decrypting the input ciphertext using all secret keys {sk i } i∈F −1 (T ) (If some decryption succeeds, then the simulator honestly performs the reencryption and otherwise returns random group elements like RO does.), and (2) the reduction in H 1 b can easily produce sk i for i ∈ F −1 (T ) just by sending a k * i query to RO, and decrypting the resulting ciphertext using sk F (i) .
At this point, we can show that H 2 0 is indistinguishable from H 2 1 by showing that I-Enc(pk, id 0 , m 0 )
The proof of this proposition is shown via a sequence of intermediary hybrid experiments. First, consider a hybrid experiment H 3 b , which is identical to H 2 b , except that A 3 gets as input a valid ciphertext y that now contains a simulated zero-knowledge proof, that the ciphertext is valid, instead of the real zero-knowledge proof. Such a simulated zero-knowledge proof can be provided by the simulator using the trapdoor to crs. By the computational zero-knowledge of the proof system, it follows that experiment H 3 b is indistinguishable from experiment H 2 b .
Next, consider a hybrid experiment H 4 , which is identical to H 3 b , except that A 3 gets as input random group elements (as opposed to a valid ciphertext y), along with the simulated zeroknowledge proof. We will now show that H 3 b is indistinguishable from H 4 for b = 0, 1. We shall show that if an adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 , A 3 ) can distinguish between H 4 and H 3 b , then we can construct an adversary B that can break SXDH. To do this, we will go through a sequence of hybrids from H 3 b to H 4 . Note that y = (C, D, C , D ) where C, C ∈ G d and D, D ∈ G. In hybrid W j (for 0 ≤ j ≤ d), adversary A 3 will be given the first j elements of C as well as group element D correctly and the remaining d − j elements of C will be random elements. In hybrid V j (for 0 ≤ j ≤ d), the adversary A 3 will be given random C, D, correctly generated D and C such that the first the first j elements are generated correctly and the remaining d − j are chosen at random. Note that
We will now show the indistinguishability of W j and W j+1 for any 0 ≤ j ≤ d. (Indistinguishability of V j and V j+1 follows from a very similar argument.)
Assume that adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 , A 3 ) can distinguish between W j and W j+1 . B receives as input a tuple (ḡ,Ā =ḡā,B =ḡb,C =ḡc) and has to decide whetherc =āb or random. B receives (T , state 1 ) from A 1 . B sets g =ḡ, and picks random vectors sk i = a i for all i ∈ T . For each i / ∈ T B proceeds as follows: it chooses a ik ∈ Z q at random for all k = j. Then it chooses random ω i and implicitly sets a ij = ω iā . Finally, it uses these values to compute g a i (usingĀ ω i in place of g a ij ). Let pk = g a 1 , . . . , g a d for the values derived this way.
B now provides A 2 with (pk, { sk j } j∈T ,
(This should happen only with negligible probability, because A is only ever given g sk i = g a i ; if A can produce sk i = a i , then A breaks the discrete logarithm assumption.)
For all other messages, B chooses random r ∈ Z q and random R j+1 , . . . , R d ∈ G, and creates the ciphertext as 
C.2 Security of the Output Encryption Scheme
We show the semantic security of the output encryption scheme assuming SXDH. In other words, we show that for any two messages m 0 , m 1 , the distributions O-Enc( pk, m 0 ) and O-Enc( pk, m 1 ) are computationally indistinguishable. 9 Furthermore, we will also show that the output ciphertext hides the public key under which the message is encrypted. We show this in the theorem below:
Theorem 5 Assuming SXDH, for a randomly chosen public key pk, and for any two messages m 0 , m 1 , the distributions O-Enc( pk, m 0 ) and O-Enc( pk, m 1 ) are computationally indistinguishable. Furthermore, for two randomly chosen public keys pk 0 and pk 1 , and for a message m, the distributions O-Enc( pk 0 , m) and O-Enc( pk 1 , m) are computationally indistinguishable.
Proof.
We prove both the above statements claimed above by showing that the distribution of O-Enc( pk, m 0 ) is computationally indistinguishable from (Ê,Ĝ,Ĥ) whereÊ,Ĝ are chosen at random from G T andĤ is chosen at random from H. This follows directly from the hardness of the DDH assumption in the group H.
More formally, we show that if an adversary A can distinguish an encryption of m 0 from an encryption of m 1 under pk with non-negligible probability, then we can construct an adversary A that will break the SXDH assumption with advantage as well (similarly for the second statement claimed). A works as follows:
• A receives as input a tuple (h, A = hâ, R = h r , W ) (where h is a random generator of the group H, andâ, r are random exponents). The goal of A is to determine whether W = hâ r or not.
• A picks a random generator g of group G and sends the public key pk = (g, h, hâ) to A.
• On receiving two messages m 0 and m 1 from A, A flips a bit b at random and picks an exponent s at random from Z q . A sends the ciphertext
as the encryption of m b to A.
• Now A replies with a bit b . A simply outputs 1 if b = b (i.e., guessing that W = hâ r ) and outputs a random bit otherwise (i.e., guessing that W is random).
It is easy to see that when W is random, the ciphertext C b is independent of b (in particular is of the form (Ê,Ĝ,Ĥ) whereÊ,Ĝ are chosen at random from G T andĤ is chosen at random from H) and hence the success probability of A in this case is exactly 1 2 . In the case when W = hâ r , the ciphertext C b has the same distribution as O-Enc( pk, m b ). Hence, the adversary A has advantage at least . It is easy to see that A succeeds in determining whether W = hâ r with non-negligible advantage.
The proof of the second statement claimed (that the ciphertext hides the public key) follows in a very similar manner.
pk is an output public key. This is simply because the functionality of such a functional re-encryption oracle can be implemented using just pk, and in particular, without any knowledge of the secret key sk.
D Functional Re-encryption and General Predicate Obfuscation
In this section, we show a connection between collusion-resistant (average-case) secure obfuscation of functional re-encryption and program obfuscation of the family of functions F λ = {F : D λ → R λ } λ>0 satisfying the predicate obfuscation definition of Barak et al. [3] .
More precisely, we show that if there is an obfuscator for the circuit family FR F that achieves the notion of average-case secure obfuscation against collusion, then there is an obfuscator for the circuit family F that achieves the predicate obfuscation definition of Barak et al. [3] . Since there is no general-purpose obfuscator that satisfies the predicate obfuscation definition [3] , this shows that one cannot have a general purpose obfuscator (satisfying the definition of collusion resistance) for functional re-encryption for general functions (with large domain).
Predicate Obfuscation. We define a slightly relaxed notion of predicate obfuscation where the obfuscated program is a probabilistic circuit which is allowed to err with negligible probability on every input. This relaxation, called "approximate functionality", was already considered in [3] . In particular, their impossibility result holds even with such a relaxation.
Definition 4 (Predicate Obfuscation [3] ) An efficient algorithm O is a predicate obfuscator for the family C = {C λ } λ>0 , if it has the following properties:
• (Approximately) Preserving Functionality: There exists a negligible function neg(λ), s.t. for all input lengths λ, for any C ∈ C λ :
Pr[(O(C))(x) = C(x)] ≤ neg(λ)
The probability is taken over a uniformly random choice of x ∈ {0, 1} λ and over O's random coins.
• Polynomial Slowdown: There exists a polynomial p(λ) such that for sufficiently large input lengths λ, for any C ∈ C λ , the obfuscator O only enlarges C by a factor of p: |O(C)| ≤ p(|C|).
• Predicate Virtual Black-box: For every polynomial sized adversary circuit A, there exists a polynomial size simulator circuit S and a negligible function neg(λ), such that for every input length λ, for every C ∈ C λ :
The probability is over the coins of the adversary, the simulator and the obfuscator.
We show the connection between functional re-encryption for a family of functions F and predicate obfuscation of F below: Theorem 6 Assume that there is a semantically secure encryption scheme E = (Gen, Enc, Dec), a family of functions F λ = {F : D λ → {0, 1}} and an obfuscator O for the family C λ,F = C F,pk,sk,pk 0 ,pk 1 : F ∈ F λ that satisfies the notion of collusion-resistant average-case secure obfuscation. Then, there is a predicate obfuscator for the family F λ that satisfies the definition above.
Proof. Let O be a collusion-resistant average-case secure obfuscator for the family C F . The obfuscator O F for the family of functions F λ = F : D λ → {0, 1} λ>0 , on input a function F ∈ F λ , proceeds as follows:
• Choose an input public/secret key pair (pk, sk) ← Gen(1 λ ) and two output public/secret key pairs (pk b , sk b ) ← Gen(1 λ ) (for b ∈ {0, 1}).
• Run the obfuscator O on input the functional re-encryption circuit C F,pk,sk,pk 0 ,pk 1 to get an obfuscated program Ψ.
• Output Ψ = (Ψ, pk, sk 0 ) as the obfuscated program for F .
On input x ∈ D λ , the obfuscated program Ψ works as follows:
• Choose a uniformly random message m ← M.
• Compute a ciphertext c ← Enc(pk, id = x, m) and letĉ ← Ψ(c) be the output of the obfuscated re-encryption program Ψ on input c.
• Let m ← Dec(sk 0 ,ĉ). If m = m, output 0, else output 1.
Since both the obfuscator O and the obfuscated program Ψ run in time poly(|F |, λ), so does the obfuscator O F and the obfuscated program Ψ . In Claim 2, we show that O F indeed computes F correctly (i.e., preserves functionality) and in Claim 3, we show that O F satisfies the predicate virtual black-box property.
Claim 2
The obfuscator O F computes F correctly.
Proof. Fix any input x ∈ D. First, note that by the "preserving functionality" property, the ciphertextĉ computed by the obfuscated program O F is statistically close to a uniformly random encryption of m under the output public key pk F (x) . Secondly, for two uniformly random public/secret key pairs (pk 0 , sk 0 ) and (pk 1 , sk 1 ), and for any message m ∈ M and any x ∈ D, Pr[Dec(sk 0 , Enc(pk 1 , x, m)) = m] ≤ 1/|M| + neg(λ) where the probability is over the coins of the encryption algorithm. In other words, trying to decrypt an encryption of m under pk 1 using the secret key sk 0 will almost never yield the correct answer. Since we can assume without loss of generality that |M| has superpolynomial size 10 , it follows that for every input x, O F computes F correctly with probability 1 − neg(λ).
Claim 3
The obfuscator O F satisfies the virtual black-box property in Definition 4.
10 Note that if |M| is of polynomial size, then we can modify the obfuscation program to pick polynomially many messages at random from M and output 0 if the majority of the ciphertexts obtained decrypt back to the same message (and 1 otherwise). (2) Now, by the definition of average-case secure obfuscation, we are guaranteed a simulator S such that Pr[D FR F,pk,sk,pk 0 ,pk 1 (A(O(FR F,pk,sk,pk 0 ,pk 1 ), sk 0 )) = 1] ≈ Pr[D FR F,pk,sk,pk 0 ,pk 1 (S FR F,pk,sk,pk 0 ,pk 1 (1 λ , sk 0 )) = 1]
Proof. For every PPT adversary
Now, the simulator S F , on input 1 λ and oracle access to F , works as follows:
1. Choose public/secret key pairs (pk, sk) and (pk 0 , sk 0 ), and run S on input (1 λ , sk 0 ).
2. Handle S's oracle queries to FR F,pk,sk,pk 0 ,pk 1 as follows:
(a) On query a ciphertext c from S, decrypt c using sk and obtain the value of x ∈ D and m ∈ M. (b) Next, query the F -oracle with x and learn F (x) ∈ {0, 1}. (c) Construct the ciphertextĉ = Enc(pk F (x) , m) and return it to S as oracle FR F,pk,sk,pk 0 ,pk 1 's response.
3. Finally, run A F on whatever S outputs, and output the resulting bit.
This is a perfect simulation of the view of S, and thus:
Pr[D FR F,pk,sk,pk 0 ,pk 1 (S FR F,pk,sk,pk 0 ,pk 1 (1 λ , sk 0 )) = 1] = Pr[S
Putting together the three equations 2, 3 and 4, we get:
showing that Ψ is a predicate obfuscation of F . Claims 2 and 3, together complete the proof of Theorem 6.
Remarks
• The proof can be generalized to functions over a larger, yet polynomial-size, range. Recall that the notion of functional re-encryption as defined makes sense only for functions with polynomial size range, and thus, this is the best we can hope for.
• Barak et al. [3] show impossibility of predicate obfuscation for a family of functions with large, superpolynomial, range. Thus, their result cannot be used directly to rule out the possibility of functional re-encryption for all (polynomial-time computable) function families. However, the result of [3] can easily be extended to show the impossibility of predicate obfuscation for a family of functions with polynomial range. This result does not contradict our result, as their result only rules out a general obfuscator where the obfuscator runs in time O(poly(|F |)) for any function F . Note that this is not the case for our positive results, as we restrict the function F to have polynomial sized domain.
